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Abstract 
Anti-dumping policy is an important instrument of trade policy as far as 
protecting markets against dishonest practices of foreign suppliers is concerned 
and it is compliant with international regulations such as e.g. these set by the 
World Trade Organisation. Generally, dumping concerns exporting commodities 
at lower prices than a selling price of commodities (so-called normal value). Anti-
dumping policy uses appropriate preventive means against dishonest practices in 
a situation when:  
• commodity was brought to customs territory of an importing country at 
dumping prices,  
• import inflicted damage (or threatens to do it) to importing country’s industry.  
The first principles of anti-dumping policy were formulated in 1964 at the 
United Nations Conference and Development UNCTAD. The agreement was 
signed by 194 countries, including Poland. A similar agreement was also signed 
by the European Union countries. One of the types of agreements is tariff 
agreements in which a tool used as a system of cataloguing commodities in 
international trade is so-called Combined Nomenclature (CN). The system is used 
in customs proceedings and for registration needs. Anti-dumping proceedings also 
use HS classification system formulated by the World Customs Organization. 
The aim of the paper is to determine the proportion of goods covered by 
anti-dumping proceedings in the value of import conducted by the European 
Union between 1995–2012. In the empirical research the eight-digit commodity 
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codes CN8 were used as well as HS2 codes that allow grouping imported 
commodities covered by anti-dumping proceedings by their manufacturing 
divisions. In that way a determined classification of commodities was used to 
describe a comparative advantage. To conduct assessment the modified Ballasa 
index (Bi) and Grupp/Legler index were used. The result of conducted analysis 
is determination of groups of commodities that are crucial for export of a given 
country.  
 
Keywords: antidumping, trade policy, revealed comparative advantages, chattiness 
1. Introduction 
The Uruguay Round led to the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on 1 
January 1995. The main objective of the World Trade Organization is the 
liberalization of international trade through the elimination of restrictions hindering 
the development of trade, the reduction of customs tariffs and settlement of disputes 
between its members. During the operation period of the GATT and the activities of 
the World Trade Organization, significant progress has been achieved in the 
reduction and consolidation of customs tariffs as well as the prohibition of applying 
non-tariff barriers, which in turn increased international trade, deepening the process 
of the integration of the world economy and increasing the economic 
interdependence between countries. All of this was supposed to contribute to a full 
freedom of international trade in goods and services. However, when observing 
international trade, one can see that new restrictions are replacing the reduced ones. 
Anti-dumping is one of these new forms of protection.  
According to the WTO, dumping occurs when the goods or services are sold 
abroad for a price lower than that set for them in similar conditions in the domestic 
market, where the sales are performed in the ordinary course of trade. From the legal 
point of view, dumping is considered a form of unfair trade and the affected 
businesses may apply for protection against these trade practices. From the 
economic point of view, however, dumping should be treated as an element of 
business strategy, adapting to the conditions and environment in which a particular 
company competes. Trade barriers existing between countries and separating the 
domestic markets are among the factors conducive to the use of the dumping 
strategy. Another reason for dumping is due to the state tolerating monopolistic 
structures where the monopoly sells goods abroad at dumping prices in order to 
maximise profits.  
                                               Analysis Of The EU Anti-dumping Policy…                                  45 
Anti-dumping policy is a deliberate action taken by the state against unfair 
trade in situations where an imported commodity (or a similar one) is sold on the 
market of the importing country at a price lower than that on the market of the 
exporter (Kuna-Marszałek 2007, pp. 57–58). From the economic point of view, 
anti-dumping is a form of protection, while from the legal point of view it prevents 
unfair competition in international trade. 
The European Union is a major player in world trade. Excluding intra-EU 
trade, it accounts for almost one-fifth of world trade in goods. The European 
Union is also at the forefront of countries using anti-dumping for additional 
protection of its own market and domestic producers. Between 1995–2013, the 
EU initiated 450 new anti-dumping proceedings. 
This paper has two goals. The first is to calculate the value of imports 
covered by the EU anti-dumping proceedings and to describe its structure in terms 
of production sections. The second goal consists of verifying the hypothesis that 
the EU anti-dumping proceedings concern those commodity groups in which the 
EU has either failed to get a comparative advantage or is losing it. The relevant 
research covered the years 1995–2013. 
2. The share of goods covered by anti-dumping proceedings in the value of 
the imports 
The value of EU imports covered by anti-dumping proceedings was 
calculated on the basis of the eight-digit commodity codes for the subheadings of the 
Combined Nomenclature (CN8). This was justified by the fact that the EU conducts 
most of its anti-dumping investigations at this particular level. However, this 
approach has a weakness, as the value of an import under a given CN8 commodity 
code does not have to be identical with the value of an import covered by the anti-
dumping proceedings concerning this code. Due to the selective nature of the anti-
dumping proceedings (the proceedings may cover only some countries exporting  
a given product to the EU and not all entities in those countries), the latter figure is 
probably lower than the value of the entire commodity code. 
The value of an import under particular commodity codes was then 
referenced to total imports, imports under sections of goods (at the two-digit 
subdivision level HS2) and imports of product groups (at the four-digit subdivision 
level HS4) respectively. The purpose of comparing the value of the imports 
covered by anti-dumping proceedings with the value of imports on the HS2 and 
HS4 levels is to understand the importance of anti-dumping proceedings not only 
with regards to total sales, but also on the levels corresponding to particular 
segments and groupings of goods. It may turn out that anti-dumping, with its 
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marginal share in the total extra EU import, could become a crucial instrument 
used for the protection of specific commodity markets. 
Table 1 shows the number of commodity codes covered by the EU anti-
dumping proceedings in the years 1995–2013 as well as the percentage share of the 
value of imports under these codes in total EU imports, imports on the HS2 level 
and imports on the HS4 level. For each subdivision, average percentage share as 
well as the minimum and maximum shares in a given year were taken into account. 
The calculations were based on 7581 eight-digit commodity codes used during the 
research period in anti-dumping proceedings initiated by the EU. This number 
results from a single consideration of each code in a given year, regardless of the 
number of countries against which the anti-dumping proceedings were initiated (in 
the case of a multiple use of commodity codes resulting from the number of 
countries in the analysed period, the number would be 1697). The number of 
countries covered by the anti-dumping proceedings in a given year does not affect 
the annual value of particular commodity codes. The import values, which were 
used to calculate the data on Table 1, include changes caused by the two 
enlargements (2004 and 2007) of the European Union during the research period.2 
The number of CN8 commodity codes covered by the anti-dumping proceedings 
initiated by the EU varied in different years of the research period. It ranged from 
only five in 2003 to 74 in 2005. The value of the commodity codes, i.e. the value of 
the imports into the EU, is much more important than the number of commodity 
codes. Compared to the total value of extra EU imports, the imports covered by anti-
dumping proceedings on the CN8 level amounted on average to 0.86% in individual 
years of the research period. This ratio is relatively low, but in absolute terms it 
translates into almost EUR 10 billion (annual average) of imports covered by anti-
dumping proceedings. The share of imports covered by anti-dumping proceedings was 
smallest in 2013 (rate of 0.05%) and largest in 2012 (rate of 2.83%). The share of the 
value of commodity codes covered by anti-dumping proceedings in the total value of 
imports may be slightly underestimated due to the fact that the research focused on 
initiated anti-dumping proceedings only, rather than on the final measures in force.3 
                                                 
1
 The number of commodity codes covered by anti-dumping proceedings is not the same as the 
number of these proceedings, as the one proceeding may cover a greater number of commodity codes. 
2
 The enlargement with Croatia was eliminated due to a too-short research period. 
3
 Research into anti-dumping measures still in force was performed by C.P. Bown. He assessed  
a share of the EU import covered by final measures on the HS6 level in total extra imports (with no 
crude oil) at the level 0.8% –3.1% in the years 1990–2009. See C.P. Bown, “Taking Stock of 
Antidumping, Safeguards and Countervailing Duties, 1990–2009”, The World Economy, Vol. 34, Issue 
12, Dec. 2010, pp. 1955–1998. 
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Table 1. Number of commodity codes covered by anti-dumping proceedings initiated by the 
EU and their share in the total value of imports, imports on the HS2 level and imports 
on the HS4 level in the years 1995–2013 
Year 
Number 
of CN 
codes 
Share of codes in value of imports (w %) 
Total  HS2 (avr.) 
HS2 
(min.) 
HS2 
(max.) 
HS4 
(avr.) 
HS4 
(min.) 
HS4 
(max.) 
1995 37 1.07 10.02 0.30 65.80 43.21 2.24 97.44 
1996 36 0.58 11.37 1.35 34.77 26.96 2.47 60.25 
1997 51 0.62  4.01 0.02 17.54 37.59 1.22  100.00 
1998 15 0.10  3.77 1.06  8.70 33.52   14.80 63.58 
1999 50 1.16  4.52 0.01 15.01 33.95 0.94 90.42 
2000 24 0.39  3.52 0.18 17.74 34.83 4.66  100.00 
2001 29 0.28  3.71 0.09  9.91 37.91 3.95  100.00 
2002 33 0.34  5.62 0.27 21.75 27.04 1.00 65.52 
2003 5 0.08  4.35 0.10 14.87 39.38 7.69 64.14 
2004 55 0.46  5.75 0.20 33.93 27.42 1.02  100.00 
2005 74 1.12  9.31 0.21 71.95 58.35 6.18  100.00 
2006 51 1.42  3.48 0.07 18.27 36.15 1.02 97.83 
2007 31 0.34  4.76 0.49 10.89 24.05 1.07 60.57 
2008 69 1.35  2.69 0.05  8.63 50.71   11.43  100.00 
2009 22 0.24  3.09 0.46  8.11 22.46 0.77 63.87 
2010 64 1.13  4.85 0.21 20.78 45.25 0.67  100.00 
2011 62 1.13  8.06 0.03 40.14 38.70 0.10  100.00 
2012 36 2.83 12.26 1.04 34.51 66.95   15.82  100.00 
2013 14 0.05  4.50 0.07 11.80 51.72 1.04 99.33 
1995–2013    758 0.86  5.83 0.01 71.95 38.50 0.10  100.00 
Note: the codes were verified and adjusted according to the changes occurring in the Combined Nomenclature 
in particular years. Some codes for 1996-1997 are missing, as they were given at the HS6 level. 
Source: own calculations based on: C.P. Bown, Global antidumping database, (www.worldbank.org), 
supplemented by Reports of the European Commission Anti-dumping anti-subsidy safeguard, 
Statistics covering 1996-2013; data from relevant regulations of the European Commission 
ec.europa.eu; Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/mainxtnet.do 
In relation to the extra EU imports on the HS2 subdivision level (production 
sections), the share of imports covered by the anti-dumping proceedings is growing. 
The average annual share in the research period amounted to 5.83% and was over six 
times higher compared to the previous index. As expected, the importance of anti-
dumping on the level of particular production sections is therefore correspondingly 
higher. The given average shows the existence of huge disparities: in the research 
period, the index ranged from 0.01% in 1999 to 71.95% in 2005. The given maximum 
value of the index means that over two-thirds of external imports on the level of one of 
the HS2 sections were covered by anti-dumping proceedings initiated by the EU. 
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In a similar way, one can show the scope of imports covered by anti-
dumping proceedings in relation to external imports on the HS4 subdivision level 
(product groupings). On that level of product groupings, the annual average index 
was as much as 38.50% during the research period. It should be noted that the 
minimum and maximum values were very distant from each other and ranged 
from 0.10% (2011) to 100%, with the maximum value occurring on many occasions. 
The latter index means that in certain years of the research period all commodity 
groups on the HS4 level were covered by EU anti-dumping proceedings. 
3. Structure of imports covered by anti-dumping proceedings by production 
sections 
The purpose of the analysis performed in this chapter is to identify 
production sections covered by the EU’s anti-dumping policy and to determine 
their absolute and relative importance in the total number of commodity codes 
covered by anti-dumping proceedings and in their value. The analysis covers 
production sections on the HS2 subdivision level, chosen on the basis of a list of 
758 CN8 codes covered by anti-dumping proceedings initiated between 1995–2013. 
The number of CN8 commodity codes covered by the anti-dumping proceedings in 
each separate HS2 segment and their values were taken into account and then 
compared with the total number of analysed commodity codes in the extra EU 
imports and the total value of these codes. Table 2 shows the results of this analysis.  
Table 2. Share of CN8 commodity codes covered by anti-dumping proceedings initiated by the 
European Union in the total number of the analysed codes and their values according 
to the HS2 production sections, 1995–2013 
Chapter Codes covered by anti-dumping 
Short title Id Number in % Value in % 
Fish and crustaceans. molluscs and other aquatic  
invertebrates 03 18 2.37 3071230695 1.62 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons 08 3 0.40 64936314 0.03 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils 15 7 0.92 327844305 0.17 
Preparations of vegetables. fruit. nuts or other parts  
of plants 20 5 0.66 103480259 0.05 
Miscellaneous edible preparations 21 2 0.26 941762527 0.50 
Beverages. spirits and vinegar 22 5 0.66 577082218 0.30 
Residues and waste from the food industries 23 2 0.26 65459238 0.03 
Mineral fuels 27 21 2.77 58622608602 30.97 
Inorganic chemicals 28 14 1.85 897944775 0.47 
Organic chemicals 29 29 3.83 1768701007 0.93 
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Fertilisers 31 5 0.66 580523121 0.31 
Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing  
preparations 34 3 0.40 367541382 0.19 
Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues;  
enzymes 35 1 0.13 207196296 0.11 
Miscellaneous chemical products 38 13 1.72 9172801350 4.85 
Plastics and articles thereof 39 18 2.37 5113976360 2.70 
Rubber and articles thereof 40 7 0.92 777672318 0.41 
Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather 41 2 0.26 10624706 0.01 
Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; 42 9 1.19 1465781815 0.77 
Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal 44 5 0.66 1118698556 0.59 
Paper and paperboard 48 16 2.11 925475798 0.49 
Cotton 52 15 1.98 857721301 0.45 
Man-made filaments 54 17 2.24 1814209339 0.96 
Man-made staple fibres 55 3 0.40 969243342 0.51 
Wadding, felt and nonwovens 56 9 1.19 44220766 0.02 
Other made-up textile articles; 63 12 1.58 1650559494 0.87 
Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles 64 55 7.26 10505579247 5.55 
Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos 68 11 1.45 599904746 0.32 
Ceramic products 69 22 2.90 1839271855 0.97 
Glass and glassware 70 19 2.51 1312721331 0.69 
Iron and steel 72 123 16.23 10944061470 5.78 
Articles of iron or steel 73 163 21.50 9636425908 5.09 
Aluminium and articles thereof 76 8 1.06 1904385163 1.01 
Zinc and articles thereof 79 3 0.40 234254572 0.12 
Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof 81 5 0.66 314958072 0.17 
Miscellaneous articles of base metal 83 5 0.66 198691069 0.10 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical  
appliances; 84 11 1.45 3474193797 1.84 
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof 85 66 8.71 52071312196 27.51 
Wehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock 87 15 1.98 3299225081 1.74 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic; 90 5 0.66 822171131 0.43 
Toys, games and sports requisites; parts  
and accessories  95 1 0.13 447799671 0.24 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 96 5 0.66 186790682 0.10 
Note: the total number of CN8 codes is 758 and their total value in the research period was EUR 189.3 billion. 
Source: own calculations based on: C.P. Bown, Global antidumping database, (www.worldbank.org), 
supplemented by reports from the European Commission Anti-dumping anti-subsidy safeguard 
statistics covering 1996–2013; data from relevant regulations of the European Commission 
ec.europa.eu; Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/ mainxtnet.do; Combined 
Nomenclature, European Union Journal of Laws, 31.10.2013. 
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Table 2 shows that the initiated anti-dumping proceedings covered 41 HS2 
segments. Taking into account the total number of 99 sections in the Combined 
Nomenclature, it can be noticed that almost every second section was covered by 
anti-dumping proceedings. In particular sections, the number of CN8 commodity 
codes varied and ranged from 1 (0.13% of the total number of codes) to 163 
(21.5%). Segments in which a relatively high number of codes were covered by 
the anti-dumping proceedings included 73 (iron or steel articles), 72 (iron and 
steel), 85 (electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof) and 64 (footwear, 
gaiters and the like). In total, these four sections accounted for 54% of the total 
number of CN8 commodity codes. At the other extreme, there were two branches 
(35 – albuminoidal substances and 95 – toys, games and sports requisites) in 
which only one CN8 code was covered by the anti-dumping proceedings. 
Apart from the number of codes in particular production sections, Table 2 
also includes information about the values of particular codes and their share in 
the total value of all codes covered by the proceedings. The number of codes in 
anti-dumping proceedings does not have to be proportional to the value of the 
imports covered by these codes. In terms of the value of imports covered by the 
proceedings, two sections can be distinguished: 27 (mineral fuels) and 85 
(electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof). In total, the codes from 
these two sections accounted for nearly 59% of the value of imports covered by 
EU anti-dumping proceedings. The most important sections in terms of the 
number of codes (72 and 73) accounted for less than 11% of the value of the 
commodity codes covered by anti-dumping proceedings. The obtained result 
differs substantially from the structure above, resulting from the consideration of 
the commodity codes in particular production sections. Moreover, the dominant 
share of mineral fuels in the value of imports covered by anti-dumping 
proceedings is surprising. Analysis of specific proceedings covering codes from 
Section 27 allows this paradox to be explained, at least partially. Almost all 
commodity codes from Section 27 relate to bioethanol (i.e. ethyl alcohol made 
of agricultural products) and biodiesel (i.e. fatty acid esters and/or paraffinic 
diesel fuels of non-fossil origin).4 It can therefore be assumed that the anti-
dumping proceedings in this particular case are an instrument protecting EU 
agricultural markets that provide the raw materials for bioethanol and biodiesel. 
                                                 
4
 Procedures related to the implementation of a common trade policy. Notification of the initiation 
of anti-dumping proceedings concerning import of biodiesel coming from the USA Journal of Lows  
C 147 of 13.06.2008; Procedures related to the implementation of a common trade policy. Notification 
of the initiation of anti-dumping proceedings concerning import of biodiesel coming from the USA 
Journal of Lows C 345 of 25.11.2011; Procedures related to the implementation of a common trade 
policy. Notification of the initiation of anti-dumping proceedings concerning import of biodiesel coming 
from the USA Journal of Lows C 260 of 29.08.2012. 
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4. The structure of EU imports covered by anti-dumping proceedings  
in terms of revealed comparative advantages 
The aim of this study is to answer the question of whether the EU had  
a comparative advantage in particular commodity codes during the analysed 
period and, if so, what the trend of those changes was – i.e. whether the advantage 
increased or decreased. In this study, one-by-one two indices of the revealed 
comparative advantage were used: the Balassa Index (RCAi, revealed comparative 
advantage) and the Grupp/Legler Index (RCAi). Each study was conducted for 
several years, which allowed changes to be observed. 
B. Balassa noted that comparative advantages could be “revealed” based on 
observing trade flows, which reflect differences in the possession of resources by 
particular countries. Thus, he developed an index measuring a country’s revealed 
comparative advantage. The Balassa Index determines the competitive advantage 
of a country, the measure of which is the share of the export of the ith product from 
the jth country in the total world export of that product as well as its comparative 
advantage, the measure of which is the ratio of the above share to a share of the jth 
country in world exports. This index belongs to a group of measures analysing the 
performance of particular countries in international trade flows and as such is 
sometimes used to study the international competitiveness of countries. Its 
advantage consists of its simplicity of construction and application in empirical 
research. On the other hand, because the Balassa Index is calculated on the basis 
of the observed trade flows, it takes into account all elements that affect these 
flows, not just specific factors of production which are the source of a comparative 
advantage on the basis of the traditional theory of trade (Leromain, Orefice 2013, 
p. 3). Therefore, the estimated values of this index may be characterised by a certain 
instability over time, while comparative advantages should be characterised by  
a relative stability over time. 
In this study, a modified version of the Balassa Index better suited for the 
purposes of the study was applied. Two types of changes were introduced. 
Firstly, the values of the imports should be compared because anti-dumping 
proceedings concern imports. Secondly, as anti-dumping proceedings apply only 
to extra-EU imports, total EU imports were divided into intra-EU and extra-EU 
groups.5 The modified index takes into account the intra-EU import, i.e. imports 
of member states from other member states, as well as total EU imports, which 
                                                 
5
 Research into the EU’s revealed comparative advantage on the basis of imports and separated 
internal imports appeared in the literature in the publication A. Khatibi, The trade effects of European 
antidumping policy, ECIPE working paper, 2009, pp. 1–13. 
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cover both intra-and extra-EU imports (i.e. import from third countries). The 
formula of the index used in this chapter is as follows: 
                     RCAUEi = ( UE trainim − / Mi-total) / ( UEtrainm  / Mtotal)                           (1)
where:  
UE
trainim −  – intra-EU imports of the i
th
 product (i=1,…, 569), 
totaliM −  – total import (intra+extra) of the –th product (i=1,…, 569) into the EU 
market, 
UE
trainm  – intra EU imports, 
totalM  – total imports (intra+extra) into the EU market. 
The first expression of the above formula means a share of internal imports 
from the ith product in the total import of that product, thus indicating which part 
of EU imports of the ith product is covered by intra-EU imports. The second 
expression means the share of intra-EU imports in total EU imports. The relation 
of the first expression to the second one indicates the possible comparative 
advantage of the EU in importing the ith product. The interpretation of the results 
is as follows: the value of the RCAUE index in the range of 0–1 suggests the EU’s 
lack of comparative advantage with regards to the ith product, while the value of 
1 above suggests the presence of a comparative advantage of the EU in the ith 
product; the higher the value the greater the advantage. 
The RCAi Grupp/Legler (G/L) Index expresses a slightly different approach 
towards the revealed comparative advantage, taking into account the relationship 
between exports and imports on the world market level. As opposed to the 
modified Balassa Index, which compares the competitiveness of EU entities with 
entities outside the EU only on the EU import market, where EU entities are 
relatively privileged, the G/L Index compares competitiveness on the global 
market level, where all entities operate in similar conditions. Considering the 
Grupp/Legler Index beside the Balassa Index allows a more comprehensive 
analysis of the EU’s comparative advantages to be performed. The Grupp/Legler 
Index, referring to a different version of the Balassa Index (Faustino 1991, pp. 
203–212), is a natural logarithm of a quotient in which the ratio between the 
export of the ith product into the jth country and the import of the –th product into 
that country is the dividend, while the ratio between a country’s total exports and 
its total imports is the divisor. Both the dividend and the divisor are interpreted in 
terms of the coverage of imports by exports, but in relation to a different range of 
products. If this coverage is higher for the ith product than in the case of all products 
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covered by a country’s foreign trade, one can speak of the comparative advantage of 
that country with respect to the ith product. The logarithmisation of the above-
mentioned quotient makes interpreting the results easier because positive results 
suggest the existence of a comparative advantage for a country with respect to the ith 
product, while negative results suggest a lack of an advantage. 
In this paper, the authors will use the Grupp/Legler Index taking into 
account extra-EU exports and extra-EU imports only. Intra-EU trade was omitted 
because internal and external trading activities are pursued in substantially 
different conditions and, depending on the goods, the ratio between them can 
differ substantially, possibly distorting the results. Additional, anti-dumping 
proceedings refer only to imports from outside the EU. The formula for the G/L 
Index for the European Union, the interpretation of which is the same as that of 
the above Balassa index, is as follows: 






=
−−
UE
extra
UE
extra
UE
extrai
UE
extraiUE
i MX
MXRCA
/
)/(ln  (2) 
where:  
UE
extraiX − – extra-EU exports of the i
th
 product (i=1,…, 569), 
UE
extraiM −  – extra-EU imports of the i
th
 product (i=1,…, 569), 
UE
extraX – extra-EU exports, 
UE
extraM  – extra-EU imports. 
Analysis of both RCAUEi indices was performed using the CN8 commodity 
codes covered by EU anti-dumping proceedings between 1995–2013. The 
statistical data was collected from Eurostat. The scope of the created statistical 
database was adapted to the EU makeup over time: in the period 1995–2003 for 
the EU-15, in the period 2004–2006 for the EU-25 and in the period 2007–2013 
for the EU-27. Both indices were estimated for successive years of the period 
2000–2013, in which a total of 569 CN8 commodity codes in the initiated anti-
dumping proceedings were used (out of a total of 758 codes included in Table 1). 
In each successive year, commodity codes covered by the proceedings initiated in 
a given year were taken into account. Due to the fact that comparative advantages 
(or the lack thereof) are a relatively permanent phenomenon and in order to 
eliminate the impact of random factors (fluctuations in the economic situation, 
changes in the membership of the EU, etc.) on the value of the analysed indices, 
these indices were calculated for each commodity code for a period of five years 
preceding the year in which the proceedings were initiated. The initiation year was 
omitted so as not to distort the results with possible anti-dumping effects. For 
example, for commodity codes covered by proceedings initiated in 2000, the 
Balassa and Grupp/Legler indices were calculated for the years 1995–1999. 
54                                          Nurlybek Issabekov, Adam Mateusz Suchecki                                       
The analysis of the CN8 commodity codes covered by anti-dumping 
proceedings initiated by the EU using the modified Balassa Index of the revealed 
comparative advantage was performed in two stages. In the first stage, the indices 
estimated for the successive years, covering particular CN8 commodity codes, 
reflecting the state of affairs of the five years preceding the implementation of the 
proceedings, were divided into three groups: commodity codes where the EU had  
a comparative advantage, commodity codes where the EU did not have a comparative 
advantage, and commodity codes for which there was no comparable data. A given 
code was included in the first group if the estimated indices for most of the analysed 
five-year period suggested the existence of a comparative advantage for the EU. 
Similarly, the second group included those commodity codes for which the results 
for the majority of years indicated a lack of comparative advantage. The second 
stage of the analysis covered only commodity codes for which a comparative 
advantage had been revealed. The purpose of this stage was to answer the question of 
whether the revealed comparative advantage of the EU was increasing or decreasing. 
To answer this question, a linear trend line from the five-year periods was used. 
Table 3. Structure of the CN8 commodity codes covered by EU anti-dumping proceedings 
according to the revealed comparative advantage (measured by the modified Balassa 
Index), 2000–2013 
Years Number of CN8 
codes 
Comparative advantage Comparative advantage in % 
Yes No No data Yes No 
2000 24 18  6  75.00 25.00 
2001 29 22  7  75.86 24.14 
2002 33 17 16  51.52 48.48 
2003 5  4  1  80.00 20.00 
2004 55 25 30  45.45 54.55 
2005 74 45 29  60.81 39.19 
2006 51 19 28  4 40.43 59.57 
2007 31 20  7  4 74.07 25.93 
2008 69 43  4 22 91.49  8.51 
2009 22 15  7  68.18 31.82 
2010 64 58  4  2 93.55  6.45 
2011 62 46 14  2 76.67 23.33 
2012 36 17  9 10 65.38 34.62 
2013 14  8  4  2 66.67 33.3 
2000–2013          569   357   166 46 68.26 31.74 
* The percentages were calculated excluding commodity codes for which no data was available. 
Source: see Table 2. 
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Table 3 shows the quantity and percentage structure of the revealed 
comparative advantages relating to the commodity codes analysed in particular 
years. Out of the total 569 CN8 commodity codes covered by EU anti-dumping 
proceedings initiated between 2000–2013, 357 codes showed a comparative 
advantage for the EU, no advantage was revealed in the case of 166 codes and no 
reliable data was available for 46 codes due to the annual changes introduced to the 
Combined Nomenclature. Having disregarded the commodity codes for which there 
was no data available, the percentage structure of the revealed comparative 
advantages in relation to the 523 codes was calculated. The last two columns of 
Table 3 show that the EU had a comparative advantage in 68.26% of the commodity 
codes covered by anti-dumping proceedings and there was no advantage in the other 
cases during the analysed period. Depending on the year, the percentage of 
commodity codes with a revealed comparative advantage ranged from 40% in 2006 
to almost 94% in 2010. In the analysed period, there were only two years (2004 and 
2006) in which commodity codes without this advantage slightly prevailed.  
Table 4. Structure of the CN8 commodity codes with a revealed (based on the modified Balassa 
Index) comparative advantage for the European Union covered by anti-dumping 
proceedings initiated by the EU, taking into account the direction of the trend of the 
comparative advantage, 2000–2013 
Years Number of CN8 codes 
Linear trend Linear trend in % 
Increasing Decreasing Increasing Decreasing 
2000 18 5 13 27.78 72.22 
2001 22 12 10 54.55 45.45 
2002 17 11 6 64.71 35.29 
2003 4 3 1 75.00 25.00 
2004 25 10 15 40.00 60.00 
2005 45 15 30 33.33 66.67 
2006 19 10 9 52.63 47.37 
2007 20 11 9 55.00 45.00 
2008 43 15 28 34.88 65.12 
2009 15 3 12 20.00 80.00 
2010 58 20 38 34.48 65.52 
2011 46 30 16 65.22 34.78 
2012 17 6 11 35.29 64.71 
2013 8 7 1 87.5 12.5 
2000–2013 357 158 199 44.26 55.74 
Source: See Table 2. 
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Determining the structure of the commodity codes according to the revealed 
comparative advantage is only the first stage of the analysis, the aim of which is to 
verify the presented hypothesis. For now, it is clear that the majority of the 
commodity codes covered by EU anti-dumping proceedings were revealed to have 
a comparative advantage when measured by the modified Balassa Index. In the 
second step, we will try to answer the question of whether this comparative 
advantage was increasing or decreasing. For this purpose, The direction of the 
changes in the revealed comparative advantage for particular commodity codes in 
the analysed period were determined based on the linear trends from the index 
over a five-year period. The results are shown in Table 4. 
In the analysed period, 357 CN8 commodity codes revealed a comparative 
advantage for the EU. Of this number, 199 codes (55.74%) were characterised 
by a descending trend for the EU’s comparative advantage, while the trend grew 
in the case of 158 codes (44.26%).  
Summing up the results included in Tables 3 and 4, it can be concluded 
that out of the 523 total analysed CN8 commodity codes covered by EU anti-
dumping proceedings between 2000–2013, almost 70% of the EU codes did not 
have a comparative advantage when measured by the modified Balassa Index 
(31.74% of the analysed codes) or have lost it (38.05% of codes). In other cases 
(30.21%), a comparative advantage of the EU with a growing trend was determined. 
Therefore, the results of the study using the modified Balassa Index indicate  
a positive verification of the presented hypothesis. 
As in the case using the modified Balassa Index. The analysis of the CN8 
commodity codes covered by anti-dumping proceedings initiated by the EU 
using the G/L Index of revealed comparative advantages was performed in two 
stages. First. The G/L indices referring to particular CN8 commodity codes in 
terms of the presence or a lack of comparative advantage was estimated. In the 
second stage. The question of whether the EU’s revealed comparative advantage 
was increasing or decreasing was examined. Table 5 shows the results of the 
calculations relating to the first stage of the study. The results of the second 
phase of the study are given in Table 6. 
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Table 5. Structure of the CN8 commodity codes covered by anti-dumping proceedings initiated 
by the EU according to a revealed comparative advantage measured by the Grupp/ 
Legler Index, 2000–2013 
Years 
Number  
of CN8 
codes 
Comparative advantage Comparative advantage in % 
Yes No No data Yes No 
2000 24 13 11  54.17 45.83 
2001 29 15 14  51.72 48.28 
2002 33 18 15  54.55 45.45 
2003 5 3 2  60.00 40.00 
2004 55 25 30  45.45 54.55 
2005 74 38 36  51.35 48.65 
2006 51 18 29 4 38.30 61.70 
2007 31 10 17 4 37.04 62.96 
2008 69 35 12 22 74.47 25.53 
2009 22 9 13  40.91 59.09 
2010 64 50 12 2 80.65 19.35 
2011 62 41 19 2 68.33 31.67 
2012 36 11 15 10 42.31 57.69 
2013 14 9 3 2 75.0 25.0 
2000–2013 569 295 228 46 56.4 43.6 
*The percentages were calculated excluding commodity codes for which there was no data available. 
Source: See Table 2. 
Table 5 shows that out of the 569 analysed CN8 commodity codes covered 
by EU anti-dumping proceedings initiated between 2000–2013. 295 codes 
revealed a comparative advantage for the EU. In the case of 228 codes. no such 
advantage was found. and in the case of 46 codes there was no reliable data. The 
last two columns of Table 5 show that 56.4% of the commodity codes covered by 
EU anti-dumping proceedings revealed a comparative advantage. while the 
remaining 43.6% revealed no such advantage in the analysed period. Depending on 
the year. the percentage of commodity codes with a revealed comparative advantage 
ranged from 37% in 2007 to almost 81% in 2010. Five years of the analysed period 
(2004, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2012) were characterised by the dominance of  
a percentage of commodity codes with no revealed comparative advantage for the 
EU. In the case of both studies (using the modified Balassa Index and the G/L 
Index). it was observed that codes with a revealed comparative advantage for the EU 
dominated. However. in the case of the G/L Index. the percentage of these codes 
was lower. while the share of the commodity codes with no revealed comparative 
advantage for the EU increased by nearly 12 percentage points. 
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Table 6. Structure of the CN8 commodity codes with revealed comparative advantage for the 
European Union (based on the Grupp / Legler Index) covered by the initiated EU anti-
dumping proceedings according to the direction of the trend of the comparative 
advantage, 2000–2013 
Years Number of CN8 codes 
Linear trend Linear trend in % 
Increasing Decreasing Increasing Decreasing 
2000 13  5  8 38.46 61.54 
2001 15 10  5 66.67 33.33 
2002 18  7 11 38.89 61.11 
2003  3  1  2 33.33 66.67 
2004 25 12 13 48.00 52.00 
2005 38 12 26 31.58 68.42 
2006 18 13  5 72.22 27.78 
2007 10  4  6 40.00 60.00 
2008 35  8 27 22.86 77.14 
2009  9  4  5 44.44 55.56 
2010 50 14 36 28.00 72.00 
2011 41 25 16 60.98 39.02 
2012 11  3  8 27.27 72.73 
2013  9  5  4 55.56 44.44 
2000–2013         295        123         172        41.7         58.3 
Source: See Table 2. 
Table 6 contains the results of the analysis of the linear trend line of the 
Grupp/Legler Index for 295 CN8 commodity codes with a revealed comparative 
advantage for the EU. Out of this number. 172 codes (58.3%. a slightly higher 
percentage than in the corresponding study based on the Balassa Index) were 
characterised by a descending trend in comparative advantage and 123 (41.7%) by 
a growing trend. Declining trends in comparative advantage for the EU could be 
seen in the majority of years of the analysed period. ranging from 52% to 77.14% 
of the analysed codes. 
Summing up the results presented in Tables 5 and 6. it can be said that out of 
the total 523 available CN8 commodity codes covered by EU anti-dumping 
proceedings between 2000–2013. 76.5% of the codes showed that the European 
Union either did not reveal any comparative advantage as measured b the 
Grupp/Legler Index (43.6% of the analysed codes) or lost it (32.9% codes). 
Growing trends in the revealed comparative advantage for the EU could be observed 
in the remaining 23.5% of cases. The results of the study with the application of this 
index also indicate a positive verification of the presented hypothesis. 
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5. Conclusions 
In relation to the value of extra-EU imports. the total imports covered by 
anti-dumping proceedings analysed on the CN8 level amounted on average to 
0.86% between 1995–2013. However. this share translated in absolute terms to 
nearly EUR 10 billion (annual average) of imports covered by anti-dumping 
proceedings. The scope of imports covered by anti-dumping proceedings. though 
relatively small when compared to the total EU import. Rises substantially when 
considered in terms of particular production sections. especially in terms of 
product groupings. Thus on the level of the two-digit subdivision the share of the 
relevant CN8 commodity codes in the value of imports from HS2 production 
segments amounted on average to 5.83%. with a maximum value of 72%; on the 
four-digit subdivision level (HS4 commodity groupings). It amounted on average 
to 38.5%. reaching 100% in certain commodity groups. 
An analysis of the number of commodity codes on the CN8 subdivision 
level per production sections (HS2) confirmed the dominance of the “iron and 
steel” branch (sections 72 and 73 which also dominated the anti-dumping 
proceedings initiated by the EU during the analysed period). As it accounted for 
almost 38% of all commodity codes covered by the initiated proceedings. In terms 
of the value of imports covered by the proceedings. distinguish two sections can 
be distinguished: 27 (mineral fuels) and 85 (electrical machinery and equipment 
and parts thereof). In total. these two sections accounted for nearly 59% of the 
value of imports covered by EU anti-dumping proceedings. The surprising thing 
was the dominant share of mineral fuels in the value of imports covered by EU 
anti-dumping proceedings. When looking at particular proceedings covering the 
codes from Section 27 (which accounted for over 30% of the value of the 
proceedings). the paradox can be at least partly explained. Almost all of the 
Section 27 commodity codes relate to bioethanol and biodiesel. It can therefore be 
assumed that anti-dumping proceedings in this case are an instrument protecting 
the European Union’s agricultural markets that supply raw materials for biofuels. 
Referring to the verified hypothesis. it can be stated that in the analysed 
period 70% of the anti-dumping proceedings initiated by the EU related to 
imports with commodity codes in which the EU either no longer demonstrated  
a comparative advantage or was losing it. This conclusion is based on the study 
of two indices of revealed comparative advantage: the modified Balassa Index 
and the Grupp/Legler Index. No comparative advantage for the EU in the CN8 
commodity codes covered by these proceedings was seen more clearly in the 
case of the Grupp/Legler Index. This is understandable due to the fact that the 
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G/L Index compares the competitiveness of EU businesses on the global market 
level. while the Balassa Index compares this exclusively on the EU import 
market, where the status of the EU entities is relatively privileged. 
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Streszczenie 
 
ANALIZA POLITYKI ANTYDUMPINGOWEJ UE POD KĄTEM 
UJAWNIONYCH PRZEWAG KOMPARATYWNYCH  
 
Artykuł jest poświęcony postępowaniom antydumpingowym wszczętym w latach 
1995–2012 przez UE. Została w nim krótko opisana zasada stosowania antydumpingu przez 
UE. Przedstawiona na poziomie ośmiocyfrowej dezagregacji (kody towarowe CN8) udział 
towarów objętych postępowaniami antydumpingowymi w wartości importu. Struktura tych 
kodów towarowych importu objętych postępowaniami antydumpingowymi. z uwagi na 
zasobochłonność oraz w pogrupowaniu na działy produkcji (HS2). Przedstawiono analizę 
ujawnionej przewagi komparatywnej dla tych kodów towarowych na podstawie 
zmodyfikowanego wskaźnika Ballasy oraz wskaźnika Grupp/Leglera dla których wszczęte 
zostały postępowania antydumpingowe przez UE. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: postępowanie antydumpingowe, przewaga komparatywna, zasobochłonność 
 
